Title
Surviving Cognitive Hybridization: Personal Identity and AI-Assisted Brain–Computer Interfaces
Abstract
This paper asks whether AI-assisted brain–computer interfaces (AI-BCI) threaten personal identity and, more precisely, what must persist through cognitive hybridization with AI-systems for a person to remain numerically identical over time. AI-BCI increasingly participate in memory retrieval, deliberation, and decision-making; as cognitive processes are partially offloaded to AI systems, the boundary between human agent and technological artifact becomes increasingly unclear.
The analysis draws on psychological-continuity theories of personal identity, which rely on two main criteria: memory (or quasi-memory) and psychological connectedness. According to the memory criterion, a person at time T1 is identical to a person at time T2 if the latter remembers experiences of the former. According to the psychological connectedness criterion, persistence requires the right kind of causal dependence between earlier and later mental states, such that overlapping chains of beliefs, intentions, and memories link the two temporal stages.
Surprisingly, these criteria appear to diverge in cases of cognitive hybridization. If autobiographical memories remain accessible, whether neurally stored or reliably retrieved through an integrated AI system, memory continuity seems preserved. Psychological connectedness, however, appears more fragile. If beliefs or intentions originate within an AI system and are incorporated without reflective endorsement, the relevant causal relations grounding continuity may be weakened.
It is argued that if personal identity is to persist through cognitive hybridization, two revisions are required. First, the memory criterion must be realizer-neutral: what matters is not the biological substrate but the functional role of memory. Second, psychological connectedness must be reformulated in agential rather than purely causal terms. What must persist is not uninterrupted neural causation, but a stable structure of belief, reason, and intention endorsement attributable to a unified agent.
About Christophe
Christophe Facal is a doctoral candidate at McGill University studying human enhancement through biotechnology. Under the mentorship of Jocelyn Maclure and Chris Howard, his research examines how biotechnological enhancement affects autonomy, freedom, beliefs, and human nature. He holds a dual bachelor’s degree in French literature and philosophy and a master’s in philosophy from the Université de Montréal. Beyond bioethics, Facal investigates the philosophy of emotions and artificial intelligence with the AIOLIA initiative and serves on the Stephen A. Jarislowsky Chair in Human Nature and Technology research team.