Title
Evidencing Biological Naturalism
Abstract
In discussions concerning the possibility of AI consciousness, computational functionalism has been the dominant position. This is the view that consciousness is essentially a kind of computation and therefore medium (or substrate) independent (not reliant on any one kind of physical realizer). The opposing position, biological naturalism, has recently been discussed by Block (2025) and Seth (2026). This is the view that consciousness is essentially a property of (some) living organisms and is therefore medium dependent. According to Block, the debate between computational functionalism and biological naturalism is over whether it is the computational role or the material realizer that determine consciousness. Here I argue that biological naturalism is better understood as the thesis that in living, conscious beings, roles and realizers are inextricably related in such a way that the computational functionalist requirement of medium independence cannot obtain. I discuss findings in neuroscience that are relevant to this issue. Although the neuroscience is still not settled, we can already rule out claims of medium independence of brain processes based on consideration of the greater energy efficiency of medium dependent processing.
About Mazviita
Mazviita Chirimuuta is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, specialising in the philosophy of neuroscience and the philosophy of perception, as well as the history of the mind/brain sciences. She received her PhD in Vision Science from the University of Cambridge. She is the author of Outside Colour: Perceptual Science and the Puzzle of Colour in Philosophy (MIT Press, 2015) and The Brain Abstracted (MIT Press), which received the 2025 Lakatos Award.