Title
On not being a robot: AI as a threat to rational agency
Abstract
As Robert Brandom has argued, in order to possess and exercise rational agency—to make judgments and to assess the judgments of others—one must be recognised as a rational agent by other rational agents who, in turn, one recognises as competent to assess one’s rational agency. Moreover, the process of assessing the judgments of other agents is one in which participants must accept moral responsibility for —must “stand behind”—their claims. Unfortunately, machines are not yet—and are unlikely ever to be—moral agents. Consequently, they are unable to recognise us and/or evaluate our claims. The more other people interact with machines, the less they can serve to establish our own status as rational agents. Human interactions with AI systems therefore constitute a profound and, as yet, mostly unrecognised threat to human agency. If we do not want our relationship to machines to reduce us to robots, we will need to rethink both the future of human-computer interaction and our account of what it means to be human.
This is joint work with Dr Gene Flenady (Monash University).
About Robert
Robert Sparrow is a Professor in the Philosophy Program at Monash University, where he works on the ethics of emerging technologies, including robotics, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology. He has published widely on the moral and political implications of new technologies, ranging from autonomous weapons and military robotics to the ethics of human enhancement.